‘Abu Hind’ Was Not Suresh Salley — It Was an Indian Cyber Operation to Trap Zahran!
The first public mention of ‘Abu Hind’ came from Fr. Cyril Gamini, at a book launch held shortly after Anura Dissanayake became President. He claimed that ‘Abu Hind’, the mastermind behind the Easter attacks, was someone well known. He said Ravi Seneviratne had identified Abu Hind, but political pressure prevented his arrest.
Now, some believe Abu Hind is Suresh Salley. For their information:
The ‘Abu Hind’ operation was a complex, wide-ranging intelligence mission planned to trap Zahran. The background:
By 2017, ISIS had lost 95% of the territory it controlled. This led to a new trend: foreign fighters returning from Syria to start ISIS operations in their home countries. This raised the risk of ISIS growth in South Asia, including Sri Lanka and India. At the time, ISIS was keen to expand its ‘Khorasan Province’ in South and Central Asia. India worked to contain ISIS spread in the region.
By then, Indian intelligence had an alert on Zahran. Sri Lanka’s Military Intelligence and State Intelligence Service (SIS) also had information on him. SIS received info on Zahran as early as 2014.
‘Abu Hind’ was a nom de guerre used by ISIS. Several senior ISIS leaders used it in Syria and Afghanistan. One was Mohammed Shafi Armar from Karnataka, India, who managed ISIS recruitment for the Indian subcontinent online. He used the name ‘Abu Hind al-Hindi’ (he appears in the photo here). India’s RAW ‘Q’ Branch created a fake cyber account based on his communication style, and used this fake ‘Abu Hind’ to contact Zahran.
Sri Lanka’s Military Intelligence and SIS shared information on Zahran and his group with Indian agencies. Military Intelligence had planted informants inside Zahran’s group. One example: ‘Naseer’, who operated under a Group Captain from 2015, and acted as Zahran’s close associate to gather intel.
Military Intelligence also played a major role in the Eastern Province, where Zahran was most active. Phone data and IP addresses of Zahran’s group were obtained via Military Intelligence and shared with India. This helped trap Zahran online through the fake ‘Abu Hind’ cyber account.
Through cyber traps like ‘Abu Hind’, interception, and tracking, the operation identified Zahran’s group with names, ID numbers, etc. These were risky missions that could cost intelligence officers their lives. ‘Naseer’ narrowly escaped being killed by Zahran’s brother.
Zahran Hashim and his group were in contact with both the fake ‘Abu Hind’ and the real ISIS network, through direct and indirect channels.
Zahran and his brother Rilwan communicated with more than one person via encrypted apps like Threema and Telegram. They maintained links with several real ISIS handlers in Syria. FBI reports confirm Zahran communicated directly with ISIS central leadership in Syria and received official approval for the attack.
As per the Presidential Commission report, others helped Zahran’s group link with ISIS in Syria. These included the family of Nilfam — the first Sri Lankan ISIS fighter killed in Syria — and Australian-based Sri Lankan Luqman Thalib Ahmed.
Although Indian intelligence monitored Zahran via the fake ‘Abu Hind’ account, Zahran was more cunning than expected. He used instructions from both the fake account and real ISIS leaders in Syria. In the end, he broke out of the intelligence trap and sent a video pledging allegiance to ISIS.
The operation was so secret that even Indian PM Modi or NSA Ajit Doval were unaware until weeks before the attack. They were briefed via Doval in March–April 2019. With Cabinet approval, Sri Lanka’s SIS was officially informed on April 4, 2019, with further warnings on April 20 and 21.
Intelligence agencies usually don’t share sources and secret operations with regular police to protect informants. So the CID or field police did not know the specifics of India’s warnings or operations like ‘Abu Hind’ before the attacks.
Intelligence officers have no legal power to arrest people in Sri Lanka. That authority lies with police and the CID, who can track, raid, and detain suspects.
Although intelligence had information and police had enforcement power, mutual distrust and political instability at the time caused the opportunity to trap Zahran to be missed. The PCoI concluded that if police had acted immediately on intelligence warnings, the attacks could have been prevented.
It is normal for intelligence officers to communicate with and track suspects like Zahran. So similarities between phone and tower data are not unusual. Shani Abeysekara and others are trying to use that data to claim ‘intelligence tactics’ were ‘real terrorist communications’. They have managed to influence some people via social media.
Truthfully, this cannot be proven in court. But if they can coerce a few witnesses from the intelligence officers involved, Shani Abeysekara’s group sees an opening. Testimonies like ‘Pettha’s’ these days serve that purpose. There are those skilled at getting the witnesses they want through threats, money, and foreign citizenships.
What Shani Abeysekara’s group overlooks is serious: This is not just about Suresh Salley, Military Intelligence, and SIS. It concerns regional security, ultimately global security, and foreign relations.
By suffering in detention, Suresh Salley is trying to protect the secrets of such a complex intelligence operation and the parties that assisted it. Revealing some details could endanger national, regional, and international security.
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