Relocation of the Headquarters Security Forces (Jaffna)

Reports regarding the abrupt relocation of the Headquarters Security Forces (Jaffna) from Palaly, Jaffna to the mainland represent a significant departure from established principles of conventional defence and from the hard-earned operational lessons drawn from Sri Lanka’s own conflict history.

Throughout the Eelam conflict, the ‘Northern Theatre’ and Jaffna in particular, demonstrated the decisive importance of forward-deployed command structures. Control of terrain, proximity to critical infrastructure, and real-time situational awareness were not abstract concepts but operational imperatives.

The defence of the Jaffna Peninsula, including its airport, seaport, artillery positions, radar and surveillance assets, and lines of communication, depended fundamentally on an integrated command presence anchored within the operational area. Equally critical is the chain of islands Karinagar, Kayts, Mandathivu, Delft, Nainathivu, Analaithivu, Eluvaitivu, and associated islets which historically functioned both as vulnerabilities and as force multipliers.

During the conflict, these islands were exploited by non-state actors for infiltration, logistics, arms smuggling, and maritime manoeuvre. Their geographic positioning renders them indispensable for effective control of the Palk Strait and for denying hostile or clandestine maritime activity. Any dilution of command oversight across this island network risks repeating past strategic failures at a time when regional maritime dynamics are becoming increasingly complex.

Sri Lanka’s conflict experience clearly underscores that territorial denial, early warning, and rapid response in the Northern theatre cannot be effectively managed from a distant mainland headquarters. Physical separation between command authority and the operational battlespace degrades responsiveness, weakens deterrence, and erodes the credibility of defence preparedness.

Moreover, contemporary security challenges extend beyond traditional military threats. The Northern maritime domain remains exposed to non-traditional risks, including transnational crime, illicit trafficking, hybrid influence operations, intelligence penetration, and the latent risk of terrorism re-emerging through maritime vectors. Effective counter-measures against such threats require a forward-based, domain-integrated command structure capable of synchronising land, sea, air, and electronic surveillance assets without delay.

Any proposal to relocate the Headquarters Security Forces (Jaffna) must therefore be justified through a transparent, doctrine-based security assessment that clearly demonstrates how national defence, maritime domain awareness, and territorial integrity would be strengthened, ‘not compromised’.

In the absence of such justification, any attempt to proceed with this relocation should be firmly opposed in the overriding interest of ‘National Security and Strategic Stability’.

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Written by Retired Gen Chargie Gallage

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